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Abstract
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the
decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in
stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selshly in stage two, in the
face of a fairer available alternative, may inict shame on DM. DM has preferences over
sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation
that identies DMs selsh ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the
most prominent motive that can explain non-selsh choice. We identify a condition
under which shame to be selsh can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is
observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness
can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-
stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for nitely many
recipients and applied to explain a social decision makers incentive for obfuscation.
JEL Classications: C78, D63, D64, D78, D80, D81
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The notions of fairness and altruism have attracted the attention of economists in di¤erent
contexts. The relevance of these motives to decision making is both intuitively convincing
and well documented. For example in a classic dictator game,where one person gets to
anonymously divide, say, $10 between herself and a partner, people tend not to take the
whole amount for themselves, but to give a sum of between $0 and $5 to the other player.
They act as if they are trading o¤ a concern for fairness or for the other persons incremental
wealth and a concern for their own.1 Thus, preferences for fairness as well as preferences
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for altruism have been suggested and considered (for example Fehr and Schmidt [1999],
Anderoni and Miller [2002], and Charness and Rabin [2002]).
Recent experiments, however, show that this interpretation may be rash: Dana, Cain
and Dawes (2006) study a variant of the same dictator game, where the dictator is given the
option to exit the game before the recipient learns it is being played. If she opts out, she is
given a specied amount of money and the recipient gets nothing, as the game has not taken
place. It turns out that about a third of the participants choose to leave the game when
o¤ered $9 for themselves and $0 for the recipient. Write this allocation as ($9, $0). Such
behavior contradicts altruistic concern regarding the recipients payo¤, because then the
allocation ($9, $1) should be strictly preferred. It also contradicts purely selsh preferences,
as ($10, $0) would be preferred to ($9, $0). Instead, people seem to su¤er from behaving
egoistically in a choice situation where they could dictate a fairer allocation. Hence, if they
can avoid getting into such a situation, they happily do so. Real-life scenarios with this
character could be:
 donating to a charity over the phone but wishing not to have been home when the call
came,
 crossing the road to avoid meeting a beggar.
Our explanation of this type of behavior is the following: Whether a persons actions
are observed or not plays a crucial role in determining her behavior. We term "shame"
the motive that distinguishes choice behavior when observed from choice behavior when not
observed. In our model, individuals are selsh when not observed. Thus, concern for another
persons payo¤ is motivated not by altruism, but by avoiding the feeling of shame that comes
from behaving selshly when observed.2 The interpretation is that, if people are observed,
they feel shame when they do not choose the fairest available alternative.3
We axiomatically formalize the notion of shame and its interaction with selshness as
described above. To this end, we consider games like the one conceived by Dana et al (2006)
as a two-stage choice problem. In the rst stage, the decision maker (DM) chooses a menu,
a set of payo¤-allocations between herself and the anonymous recipient. This choice is not
observed by the recipient. In the second stage, she makes a potentially anonymous choice
from the alternatives on this menu, where the recipient observes the chosen alternative in full
knowledge of the menu.4 DM has well-dened preferences over sets of alternatives (menus).
2To distinguish shame from guilt, note that guilt is typically understood to involve regret, even in private,
while, according to Buss (1980), "shame is essentially public; if no one else knows, there is no basis for shame.
[...] Thus, shame does not lead to self-control in private." We adopt the interpretation that even observation
of a selsh behavior without identication of its purveyor can cause shame.
3In a parallel work, Neilson (2006-b) entertains a very similar notion of shame. The questions and the
methodology of the two works are di¤erent. Section 6 comments in more detail.
4If the exit option is chosen in the aforementioned experiment by Dana et al, as in our setup, the recipient
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Our interpretation of shame as the motivating emotion allows considerations of fairness to
impact preferences only through their e¤ect on second-stage choices, where the presence
of a fairer option reduces the attractiveness of an allocation. The underlying normative
notion of fairness is central to our model, because assumptions on the norm of fairness are
indirect assumptions on DMs preferences. Assuming a particular norm of fairness is di¢ cult,
descriptively as well as normatively. Instead, we pose what we consider minimal normative
constraints on fairness.
Our representation results establish a correspondence between DMs norm of fairness
and her choice behavior. On the one hand, this illustrates how those minimal constraints on
fairness impact choice. On the other hand, the particular norm of fairness used by DM can
be elicited from her choice behavior.
1.2. Illustration of Results
Denote a typical menu as A = f(a1; a2) ; (b1; b2) ; :::g, where the rst and second components
in each alternative are, respectively, the private payo¤ for DM and for the recipient. We pose
axioms on DMs preferences over menus that allow us to establish a sequence of representation
theorems. To illustrate our results, consider a special case of those representations:
U (A) = max
(a1;a2)2A
[u (a1) + ' (a1; a2)]   max
(b1;b2)2A
[' (b1; b2)] ,
where u and ' are increasing in all arguments. u is a utility function over private payo¤s
and ' (a1; a2) is interpreted as the fairness of the allocation (a1; a2).
Alternatively, if we denote by a and b the two maximizers above, it can be written as:
U (A) = u (a1)| {z }
value of private payo¤
   (' (b1; b2)  ' (a1; a2))| {z }
shame
.
This representation captures the tension between the impulse to maximize private payo¤
and the desire to minimize shame from not choosing the fairest alternative within a set. It
evaluates a menu by the highest utility an allocation on the menu gets, where this utility
depends on the menu itself. The utility function that is used to evaluate allocations is
additive and has two distinct components. The rst component, u (a1), gives the value of a
degenerate menu (a singleton set) that contains the allocation under consideration. When
does not observe that there was a dictator, who could have chosen another allocation. In their experiment,
the recipient is further unaware that another person was involved at all. It would be interesting to see how
informing the recipient that some other person had received $9 would change the experimental ndings. This
would correspond to our setup.
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evaluating degenerate menus, which leave DM with a trivial choice under observation, we
assume her to be selsh: she prefers one allocation to another if and only if the former gives
her a greater private payo¤, independent of the recipients payo¤. The second component is
shame.It represents the cost DM incurs when selecting (a1; a2) in the face of the fairest
available alternative, (b1; b

2).
As shame is evoked whenever this fairest available alternative is not chosen, we can
relate choice to a second binary relation "fairer than," which represents DMs private norm
of fairness. We assume that DMs private norm of fairness induces a Fairness Ranking of
all alternatives, which is represented by ' (a1; a2). We further assume that DMs norm of
fairness satises Solvability, implying that the fairness ranking is never satiated in one players
payo¤, and the Pareto criterion in payo¤s, implying that ' is increasing in all arguments.
In the special case considered here, the shame from choosing (a1; a2) in stage two is
 (' (b1; b

2)  ' (a1; a2)). Hence, even alternatives that are not chosen may matter for the
value of a set, and larger sets are not necessarily better. To see this, consider the representa-
tion above with u (a1) = a1,  = 12 and ' (a1; a2) = a1a2. Compare the sets f(10; 1) ; (4; 3)g,
f(10; 1)g and f(4; 3)g. Evaluating these sets we nd U f(10; 1) ; (4; 3)g = 9, U f(10; 1)g = 10
and U f(4; 3)g = 4. To permit such a ranking, we assume a version of Left Betweenness,
which allows smaller sets to be preferred over larger sets. Left Betweenness weakens the
Set Betweenness assumption rst introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), henceforth
GP. Theorem 1 establishes that our weakest representation, which captures the intuition
discussed thus far, is equivalent to the collection of all the above assumptions.
Selshness leaves no room for altruism. Suppose, however, that only the second stage
of the procedure is observed (for example, because DM, as in the classic dictator game,
never gets to choose between menus). In this case, our representations might conform with
DM behaving as if she had direct interest in the recipients welfare and had to trade o¤ this
altruistic motive with concerns about her private payo¤. We argue that it is hard to reconcile
such an interpretation with observing any choice reversal in stage two. Thus, when observing
stage two in isolation, shame can mimic altruism only if the induced choice ranking is set
independent. Theorem 2 establishes that, given the assumptions made so far, an additional
separability assumption on preferences over sets, Consistency, is equivalent to the existence
of such a ranking. In the special case of our representation considered above, the induced
choice behavior satises Consistency. To see this, regroup the terms as follows:
U (A) = max
(a1;a2)2A
[u (a1) + ' (a1; a2)]| {z }
second stage choice criterion
   max
(b1;b2)2A
[' (b1; b2)]| {z }
e¤ect of fairest alterative
.
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We further specify the norm of fairness by assuming that the private payo¤s to the two
players have Independent Fairness Contributions: The fairness contribution of raising one
players payo¤ can not depend on the level of the other players payo¤. The idea is that
interpersonal utility comparisons are infeasible. With this additional assumption, Theorem
3 establishes that there are two utility functions, v1 and v2, evaluated in the payo¤ to DM
and the recipient respectively, such that the value of their product represents the fairness
ranking, ' (a1; a2) = v1 (a1) v2 (a2). Thus, the fairest alternative within a set of alternatives
can be characterized as the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) of an associated game. Because
the utility functions used to generate this game are private, so is the norm.5 We argue that
when based on true selsh utilities, the NBS is a convincing fairness criterion in our context.
Those utilities, however, may not be publicly known, especially in anonymous choice situ-
ations, and therefore, DM may not be able to base her evaluation on true selsh utilities.
Nevertheless, one can assess the descriptive appeal of the representation by asking whether
the utilities comprising the norm at least resemble selsh utilities.
Example: Let u (a1) = a1, ' (a1; a2) = v1 (a1) v2 (a2) = a1a2 and  = 12 . This implies
that selsh utility u is risk neutral and unbounded, and that the utilities v, which are used
to generate the fairness ranking, coincide with u. Shame is half the di¤erence between
the Nash-product of the fairest and the chosen alternatives. Reconsider the experiment
by Dana et al (2006) mentioned above, with the added constraint that only integer val-
ues are possible allocations. The set A = f(10; 0) (9; 1) (8; 2) ; :::; (0; 10)g then corresponds
to the dictator game. It induces the imaginary bargaining game with possible utility-
allocations f(10; 0) (9; 1) (8; 2) ; :::; (0; 10) ; (0; 0)g, where the imaginary disagreement point
is lim
(x;y)!0
 
v 11 (x) ; v
 1
2 (y)

= (0; 0). According to the NBS, (5; 5) would be the outcome of
the bargaining game. Its fairness is 55 = 25. To trade o¤shame with selshness, DM chooses
the alternative that maximizes the sum of private utility and fairness, a1 + a1a2, which is
(6; 4). Its fairness is 6 4 = 24 and the shame incurred by choosing it is 1
2
. Hence U (A) = 5:5.
From the singleton set B = f(9; 0)g, which corresponds to the exit option in the experiment,
the choice is trivial and U (B) = 9. This example illustrates both the tension DM is ex-
posed to when choosing from a large set and the reason why she might prefer a smaller menu.
Finally, Theorem 4 extends the former representations by allowing DM to be responsible
for the welfare of many other recipients. This extension is then applied to model a social
decision maker who is able to alter the transparency of her policiesconsequences. Policies
5Therefore, the fairness ranking could also be represented by a di¤erent functional, based on di¤erent
utilities.
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create social value, but also have a redistributive component. DM faces a trade-o¤ when
choosing the transparency of her policies: More transparency makes it easier for the public
to perceive fair choices as such, while less transparency makes it harder for society to detect
selsh choices. Shame, therefore, might lead her to implement policies with relatively opaque
consequences.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model and a
representation that captures the concepts of fairness and shame. Section 3 isolates a choice
criterion from the choice situation. Section 4 further species the fairness ranking. Section
5 extends the representation to nitely many other players and suggests an application to a
social decision maker. Section 6 points out connections to existing literature and section 7
concludes.
2. The Model
LetK be the set of all nite subsets of R2+.6 Any element A 2 K is a nite set of alternatives.
A typical alternative a = (a1; a2) is interpreted as a payo¤pair, where a1 is the private payo¤
for DM and a2 is the private payo¤ allocated to the (potentially anonymous) other player,
the recipient. Endow K with the topology generated by the Hausdor¤ metric, which is
dened for any pair of non-empty sets, A;B 2 K, by:
dh (A;B) := max

max
a2A
min
b2B
d (a;b) ;max
b2B
min
a2A
d (a;b)

,
where d : R2+ ! R+ is the standard Euclidian distance.
Let  be a continuous preference relation (weak order) over K. We write A  B if DM
strictly prefers A to B. The associate weak preference,  and the indi¤erence relation, 
are dened in the usual way.
The choice of a menu A 2 K is not observed by the recipient, while the choice from any
menu is. We call the impact this observation has on choice "shame." Of course various other
regarding preferences that are not impacted by observation could be present as well. We
do not account for those, as our aim is not to describe a range of possible attitudes toward
others, but to derive a tractable representation according to which DM distinguishes the two
stages in an intuitive way.
The rst axiom species DMs preferences over singleton sets.
P1 (Selshness) fag  fbg if and only if a1 > b1.
6With R+ we denote the positive reals including 0. R++ denotes the positive reals without 0.
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A singleton set fag is a degenerate menu that contains only one feasible allocation,
(a1; a2). It leaves DM with a trivial choice to be made when being observed in the second
stage. Therefore, the ranking over singleton sets can be thought of as the ranking over
allocations that are imposed on DM. We contend that there is no room for shame in this
situation; choosing between two singleton sets reveals DMs truepreferences over allocation
outcomes. The axiom states that DM is not concerned about the payo¤ to the second player
when evaluating such sets; she compares any pair of alternatives based solely on the rst
component, her private payo¤. If, for example, DM had an altruistic concern for fairness
in the dictator game previously described, she would strictly prefer the menu f(9; 1)g to
f(9; 0)g. P1 rules out such altruistic concerns. Negative emotions regarding the other player,
such as spite or envy, are ruled out as well.
The next axiom captures that shame is a mental cost, which is invoked by unchosen
alternatives.
P2 (Strong Left Betweenness) If A  B, then A  A [ B. Further, if A  B
and 9C such that A [ C  A [B [ C, then A  A [B.
We assume that adding unchosen alternatives to a set can only increase shame. Therefore,
no alternative is more appealing when chosen from A [ B, than when chosen from one of
the smaller sets, A or B. Hence, A  B implies A  A [ B.7 Furthermore, if additional
alternatives add to the shame incurred by the original choice from a menu A[C, then they
must also add to the shame incurred by any choice from the smaller menu A. Thus, if there
is C such that A [ C  A [B [ C and if A  B, then A  A [B.
Shame, which is the only motive DM knows beyond selshness, must refer to some per-
sonal norm that determines what the appropriate choice should have been. In our interpreta-
tion, this norm is to choose one of the fairest available allocations. Interpreting "fairness" as
a property of an allocation, which is independent of the menu it is on, we consider a binary
relation f over R2+ as a second primitive.
Denition: If b f a, we say that DM considers b to be fairer than a.
Some of the axioms below are imposed on f rather than on  and are labeled by F
instead of P . The underlying notion of fairness is at the heart of those assumptions.8 To
7This is the "Left Betweenness" axiom. It appears in Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2005) and is a
weakening of "Set Betweenness" as rst posed in GP.
8In everyday language, "fair" is sometimes used to capture various di¤erent notions. According to the
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make them descriptively intuitive, we emphasize their normative appeal, implying that DM
will want her norm of fairness to satisfy them. Making these assumptions directly on f is
natural. The relation f is not directly observable, but the next axiom relates it to observ-
able choice behavior. One contribution of our work is that the implications of F -axioms on
 are most easily understood from the representation.
P3 (Shame) If 9A 2 K with a 2 A, such that A  A [ fbg, then b f a.9
A  A [ fbg implies that b adds to the shame incurred by the original choice in A. The
interpretation is that DM is concerned about not choosing a fairest available alternative.
Thus, b must be fairer than any alternative in A, in particular b f a.
Denition: We say that DM is susceptible to shame if there exists A and B with A  A[B.
Note that for a DM who is purely selsh,10 f is empty.
F1 (Fairness Ranking) f is an anti-symmetric and negatively transitive binary rela-
tion.
Our discussion rests on the assumption that DM can rank alternatives according to
their fairness. In R2+ and with increasing utility from self-payo¤s, this assumption is not
unreasonably restrictive.11
Combined with P3, F1 implies that only one alternative in each menu, the fairest, is
responsible for shame.
F2 (Pareto) If DM is susceptible to shame, then a  b and a 6= b imply a f b.
According to this axiom, absolute, as opposed to relative, well-being matters; the Pareto
Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition, 2001) "Fair implies an elimination of ones own
feelings, prejudices, and desires so as to achieve a proper balance of conicting interests." This is the denition
of "fair" we base our arguments on.
9The notion of "fairer than" is analogous to the denition of "more tempting than" in Gul and Pesendorfer
(2005).
10This corresponds to the "standard" economic agent, whose preferences satisfy the following variant of
P1:
A  B , max
a2A
a1 > max
b2B
b1:
Thus, for a purely selsh DM, A  B implies A  A [B.
11If, instead, there were a globally most prefered self-payo¤, this assumption would rule out very reasonable
preference rankings.
8
criterion excludes notions such as "strict inequality aversion." The resulting concept of fair-
ness must have some concern for e¢ ciency. In the case where there truly is no potential for
redistribution, we believe that people nd the Pareto criterion a reasonable requirement for
one allocation to be fairer than another.12
F3 (Solvability) If (a1; 0) f (b1; b2) then 9x such that (a1; x) f (b1; b2). Analogously, if
(0; a2) f (b1; b2) then 9y such that (y; a2) f (b1; b2).
Ignoring the qualier, the axiom states that in order to make two allocations deemed
equally fair, any variation in the level of one persons payo¤ can always be compensated by
appropriate variation in the level of the other persons payo¤. This requires f never to be
satiated in any persons payo¤. Relying on F2, the qualiers take into account that monetary
payo¤s are bounded below by 0. For example, F3 implies that there is a sum x, such that
(x; 1) f (10; 10). This assumption captures the insight that any fairness ranking with a
concern for e¢ ciency must go beyond the Pareto principle and trade o¤, in some manner,
payo¤s across individuals.
As  is continuous, f is continuous in all alternatives for which P3 relates  to f .
F1   F3 imply that this is the case on R+  R++.13 Assuming that f is continuous even
in alternatives for which P3 does not relate  to f has obviously no implication for choice.
For ease of exposition, we assume in all what follows that f is continuous on all of R2+.
Theorem 1 If DM is susceptible to shame, then  and f satisfy P1 P3 and F1 F3 re-
spectively, if and only if there exist continuous and strictly increasing functions u : R+ ! R ,
' : R2+ ! R and a continuous function g : R2+'
 
R2+
! R, weakly increasing in its second
argument and satisfying: g (a; x) R 0 whenever ' (a) Q x, such that the function U : K ! R
dened as U (A) = max
a2A

u (a1)  g

a;max
b2A
' (b)

represents  and ' represents f .
If DM is not susceptible to shame, g  0.
12In many contexts, people would disagree with the statement that the allocation (1million; 6) is fairer than
(5; 5). On the basis of the denition in footnote 10, however, we claim that the opposition to (1million; 6)
as a fair allocation can only be based on the implicit premise that there must be some mechanism to divide
the gains more evenly (Such a mechanism would imply the availability of a third option, which would render
both of the above allocations unfair.) In an explicit choice situation this premise cannot be sustained. The
Pareto property has indeed been advocated in the philosophical literature on fairness. Rawls (1971), for
example, proposes the idea of "original position," a mental exercise whereby a group of rational people must
establish a principle of fairness (e.g. when distributing income) without knowing beforehand where on the
resulting pecking order they will end up themselves. Requiring that the allocation satisy Pareto makes much
sense in such an environment.
13f is relevant for choice in alternative b, if and only if there is c with c fb and c1 > b1, which requires
c2 < b2. Thus b2 > 0 is necessary for the construction of c.
9
All detailed proofs are in the appendix. We now highlight the important steps. As both
 and f are continuous binary relations, they can be represented by continuous functions
U : K ! R and ' : R2+ ! R respectively. ' is an increasing function as implied by
Pareto (F2). The combination of Strong Left Betweenness (P2), Shame (P3) and Fairness
Ranking (F1) implies GPs Set Betweenness (SB) property: A  B implies A  A[B  B.
GP demonstrate that imposing SB on preferences over sets makes every set indi¤erent to a
certain subset of it, which includes at most two elements (Lemma 2 in their paper). Hence
we conne our attention to a subset of our domain that includes all sets with cardinality no
greater than 2. Selshness (P1) and P3 imply that a set fa;bg is strictly inferior to fag if
and only if a1 > b1 and b f a. We can then strengthen GPs Lemma 2 and state that any
set is indi¤erent to some two-element set that includes one of the fairest allocations in the
original (larger) set. Using Solvability (F3) we show the continuity of the second component,
the function g, in the representation.
The representation in Theorem 1 highlights the basic trade-o¤ between private payo¤
and shame as the only concepts DM may care about. There are at most two essential
alternatives within a set, to be interpreted as the "chosen" and the "fairest" alternative, a
and b respectively. For the latter, its fairness, ' (b), is a su¢ cient statistic for its impact on
the sets value. DM su¤ers from shame, measured by g (a; ' (b)), whenever ' (a) < ' (b),
where ' (a) is the fairness of the chosen alternative. The representation captures the idea of
shame being an emotional cost that emerges whenever the fairest available allocation is not
chosen. Its magnitude may depend on the fairness of the chosen allocation.
The main contribution of Theorem 1 is the provision of a way to elicit DMs fairness
ranking, f , from choice behavior: all functions in the representation are continuous and
hence, for b 2 R+  R++ and b f a, there is c, such that U (fa; cg) > U (fa; b; cg). Since
it is continuous, ' is then uniquely determined on its entire domain, R2+.
Note that the properties of the function g and the max operator inside imply that the
second term is always a cost (non-positive). The other max operator implies that DMs
payo¤ will never lie below b1, which is her payo¤ as suggested by the fairest allocation.
Thus, any deviations by DM from choosing the fairest allocation will be in her own favor.
These observations justify labeling said cost as "shame."
From the representation, it is easy to see that the induced choice correspondence,
C (A) :=

argmax
a2A

u (a1)  g

a;max
b2A
' (b)

may be context dependent in the sense that a higher degree of shame may a¤ect choice. In
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other words, if we dene a binary relation "better choice than," c, by a c b if 9B with
b 2 B, such that B [ fag  B, then this binary relation need not be acyclic. This feature
may be plausible when shame is taken into account. In the next section we spell out the
implications of enforcing a context-independent criterion for choice.
3. A Second-Stage Choice Ranking
In many situations, only second-stage choice may be observable. For example, the standard
dictator game corresponds only to second-stage choice in our setup. Typical behavior in
various versions of this game, where subjects tend to give part of the endowment to the
recipient, is often interpreted as motivated by an altruistic motive. We interpret altruism
to imply that the recipients welfare is a good, just as selshness implies that DMs private
payo¤ is a good.14 If DM had those two motives, she would have to make a trade-o¤ be-
tween them. As in the case of two generic goods, very basic assumptions would lead to a
context-independent choice ranking of alternatives. As we point out at the end of section 2,
we can dene a binary relation "better choice than," c, by a c b if 9B with b 2 B, such
that B [ fag  B. This binary relation need not be acyclic: Di¤erent choice problems, A
and B, may lead to di¤erent second-stage rankings of a and b, for a;b 2 A\B. If no cycles
occur, second-stage behavior might look as if it were generated by, for instance, a trade-o¤ of
selshness and altruism, even though observation of stage-one choice would rule this out. If,
on the other hand, cycles are observed in stage-two choice, simple altruistic motives cannot
be solely responsible for behavior that is not purely selsh. In this section we identify a
condition on preferences that makes DMs second-stage choice independent of the choice set.
This implies nding a function  : R2+ ! R that assigns a value to each a 2 A, such that a
is a choice from A only if  (a)   (b) for all b 2 A.
Denition: X := f(a;b) : fag  fa;bg  fbgg is the set of all pairs of alternatives gen-
erating strict Set Betweenness.
For any set of two allocations fa;bg, we interpret the preference ordering fag  fa;bg 
fbg as an indication of a discrepancy between what DM chooses (a) and the alternative she
deems to be the fairest (b), which causes her choice to bear shame. This shame, however, is
not enough to make her choose b.
Combined with F1, Shame (P3) implies that choice between sets depends on the fairness
14This interpretation is based on the following denition of altruism (Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictio-
nary [Tenth Edition, 2001] ): "Unselsh regard for or devotion to the welfare of others." We understand this
denition as ruling out any considerations that condition on available but unchosen alternatives.
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of the fairest alternative in the set. The next axiom relates choice to the fairness of the
chosen alternative as well: The fairer DMs choice, the less shame she feels.
P4 (Fairer is Better) If for fag  fa0g we have f(a;b) ; (a0;b)g  X and a f a0,
then fa;bg  fa0;bg.
Axiom P4 implies that only the fairness of the chosen alternative matters for its impact
on shame.
Given P1   P4 and F1   F3, an additional separability assumption is equivalent to sepa-
rable shame, and thus to a set-independent choice ranking.
P5 (Consistency) If
f(a;b) ; (a;d) ; (a0;b0) ; (a0;d0) ; (c;b) ; (c0;b0) ; (c;d) ; (c0;d0)g  X,
then fa;bg  fa0;b0g and fa;dg  fa0;d0g imply fc;bg  fc0;b0g , fc;dg  fc0;d0g.
We make no claim about the normative or descriptive appeal of this assumption. Instead,
we view it as an empirical criterion: If the condition is not met, observation of stage-two
choice should su¢ ce to distinguish altruism from shame as the motive behind DMs other-
regarding behavior. The axiom requires independence between the impact of the chosen and
the fairest alternative on the set ranking:
f(a;b) ; (a;d) ; (a0;b0) ; (a0;d0) ; (c;b) ; (c0;b0) ; (c;d) ; (c0;d0)g  X
implies that from each of the sets fa;bg ; fa;dg ; fa0;b0g ; fa0;d0g ; fc;bg ; fc0;b0g ; fc;dg and
fc0;d0g, the alternative listed rst is chosen in the second stage despite the availability of a
fairer alternative, which is listed second. Assume, without loss of generality that fag  fa0g.
Suppose there are two pairs of fairer and less attractive alternatives, b;b0 and d;d0, such
that for each of them pairing their members with a and a0, respectively, gives rise to indif-
ference. In the context of Theorem 1, this implies that both pairs induce the same shame
di¤erential, which exactly cancels the selsh preference of fag over fa0g: fa;bg  fa0;b0g
and fa;dg  fa0;d0g. Then, the axiom states that pairing the members of b;b0 or d;d0 with
any other chosen alternatives c and c0, respectively, must also lead to the same di¤erential
in shame. In particular, fc;bg  fc0;b0g implies fc;dg  fc0;d0g. Again, the validity of
this technical assumption in a given context is an empirical question.
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Theorem 2 If DM is susceptible to shame, then  and f satisfy P1 P5 and F1 F3 respec-
tively, if and only if there exist continuous and strictly increasing functions u : R+ ! R and
' : R2+ ! R, such that the function U : K ! R dened as U (A) = max
a2A
[u (a1) + ' (a1; a2)] 
max
b2A
[' (b1; b2)] represents  and ' represents f .
If DM is not susceptible to shame, h is a constant.
The proof constructs a path in the (a1; a2)-plane such that the fairness ' (a) increases
along this path. Then, on two neighboring indi¤erence curves in the (a; ' (b))-space, ' (b)
increases, as a varies along the path. Relying on P5, these indi¤erence curves allow us to
rescale ' (b) to make the representation of  quasi-linear.15 Separability is then immediate.
Since the proof of Theorem 2 is a special case of the proof of Theorem 4, we only go through
the more general case in detail in the appendix.
The representation isolates a choice criterion that is independent of the choice problem:
DMs behavior is governed by maximizing
u (a1) + ' (a1; a2) .
The value of the set is reduced by
max
b2A
' (b1; b2) ,
a term that depends solely on the fairest alternative in the set. Grouping the terms di¤erently
reveals the trade-o¤between self-payo¤, u (a1), and the shame involved with choosing a from
the set A:
max
b2A
[' (b1; b2)  ' (a1; a2)]  0:
Note that now shame takes an additively separable form, depends only on the fairness of
both alternatives, and is increasing in the fairness of the fairest and decreasing in that of
the chosen alternative. If P1   P4 and F1   F3 hold, then, according to Theorem 2, P5 is
equivalent to having a set-independent choice ranking.
4. Specifying a Fairness Ranking
In this section we impose one more axiom on f to further characterize the fairness ranking.
It asserts that the fairness contribution of one persons marginal payo¤ cannot depend on
the initial payo¤ levels.
15A more elaborate discussion on this technique appears after Theorem 3.
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Figure 1: Independent Fairness Contributions.
F4 (Independent Fairness Contributions) If (a1; a2) f (b1; b2) and (a01; a2) f (a1; b2)
f (b1; b02), then (a01; b2) f (a1; b02).
The axiom is illustrated in gure 1. If a1 = a01 or b2 = b
0
2, this axiom is implied by F1, F2
and the continuity of f . For a1 6= a01 and b2 6= b02, the statement is more subtle. Consider
rst a stronger assumption:
F 04 (Strong Independent Fairness Contributions) (a1; a2) f (b1; b2) and (a01; a2) f
(b1; b
0
2) imply (a
0
1; b2) f (a1; b02).
The fairness contribution of one persons marginal payo¤ cannot depend on the initial
payo¤ level of the other person: It is unclear to DM how much an increase in monetary
payo¤ means to the recipient, because even if the (marginal) utility of the recipient were
known to DM, she could not compare it to her own, as interpersonal utility comparisons
are infeasible. The qualier in F 04 establishes that DM considers the fairness contribution of
changing her own payo¤ from a1 to a01 given the allocation (a1; a2) to be the same as that of
changing the recipients payo¤ from b2 to b02 given (b1; b2). F
0
4 then states that starting from
the allocation (a1; b2), changing a1 to a01 should again be as favorable in terms of fairness as
changing b2 to b02. This is the essence of Independent Fairness Contributions. The stronger
qualier (b1; b02) f (a1; b2) f (a01; a2) in F4 weakens the axiom. For example, the fairness
ranking (a1; a2) f (b1; b2) if and only if min (a1; a2) > min (b1; b2) is permissible under F4,
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but not under F 04.
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Theorem 3 f satises F1   F4, if and only if there are continuous, increasing and un-
bounded functions v1; v2 : R+ ! R++, such that ' (a) = v1 (a1) v2 (a2) represents f .
Luce and Tukey (1964) prove the necessity and su¢ ciency of Solvability and the Cor-
responding Trade-o¤s Condition (the label they use for F4 ) to admit an additive repre-
sentation. To show how a proof works, we repeatedly use axiom F4 to establish that if
(a1; a2) f (a01; a02) and (a1;ea2) f (a01;ea02), then (ea1; a2) f (ea01; a02) , (ea1;ea2) f (ea01;ea02).
With this knowledge, we can create a monotone increasing mapping a2 !  (a2) that trans-
forms the original indi¤erence map to be quasi-linear with respect to the rst coordinate in
the (a1;  (a2)) plane. Keeney and Rai¤a (1976) refer to the procedure we employ as the
lock-step procedure. Quasi-linearity implies that there is an increasing continuous function
 : R+ ! R, such that ' (a) :=  (a1) +  (a2) represents f . Dene v1 (a1) := exp ( (a1))
and v2 (a2) := exp ( (a2)). Then v1; v2 : R+ ! R++ are increasing and continuous and if we
redene ' (a) := v1 (a1) v2 (a2), it represents f .
This representation suggests an appealing interpretation of the fairness ranking DM is
concerned about: She behaves as if she had in mind two increasing and unbounded utility
functions, one for herself17 and one for the recipient. By mapping the alternatives within
each set into the associated utility space, any choice set induces a nite bargaining game
where only the disagreement point is unspecied. DM then identies the fairest alternative
within a set as if she also had in mind a disagreement point, that makes this alternative the
Nash Bargaining Solution18 of the game.19 Moreover, the fairness of all alternatives can be
ranked according to the same functional, namely the Nash product.
Remember that F3 requires trading o¤ marginal payo¤s. The tension of having to trade
o¤marginal payo¤s without being able to compare their welfare contribution (F4) is common
in a range of social-choice problems.20 Our axioms are weak in the sense that they do not
16F4 is refered to as the Hexagon condition or the Corresponding Trade-o¤s Condition (Keeney and Rai¤a
[1976]), F 04 as the Thomsen condition. With F2 and F3, F
0
4 is implied by F4. See Karni and Safra (1998)
for a proof.
17This utility function need not agree with her true utility for personal payo¤s, u. The interpretation is
that DM is concerned about the recipients perception of her choice. The recipient, however, may not know
DMs true utility, especially under anonymity.
18See Nash (1950).
19The imaginary disagreement point is determined by lim
(x;y)!0
 
v 11 (x) ; v
 1
2 (y)

. It could be some nite
and weakly positive pair of utility payo¤s. In particular it could be (0; 0), which corresponds to DM imagining
that players walk away in the case that no agreement is reached. It could also be negative. This corresponds
to DM imagining that players have an extra incentive to nd an agreement: there is a cost to disagreement.
20For a review, see Hammond (1990).
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constrain DM in this trade-o¤, as long as she takes into account that the fairness contribution
of increasing one persons payo¤ should not depend on the others payo¤. The power of
Theorem 3 is that it bases a representation on these weak assumptions. The downside is
that the form of this representation is not unique, as the utilities v1 and v2 are not observable
independent of the norm of fairness. For example, there is another pair of increasing utility
functions such that DM is concerned about their sum, that is, she acknowledges e¢ ciency
as the only fairness criterion.
To underline the appeal of the Nash product as a descriptive representation of fairness,21
we now point out how DM might reason within the constraints of the axioms:
We justied the Pareto criterion, F2, as a plausible axiom for the fairness ranking. As
argued above, concern for fairness requires the acknowledgment of some form of interper-
sonal comparability of preferencesintensity. If utilities were known cardinally, symmetry in
terms of utility payo¤s is the other criterion we would expect the ranking to satisfy.22 In our
context, this implies independence of the role people play, dictator or recipient. However,
utilities are inherently ordinal, rendering such a comparison infeasible. At best we can, if
we assume people to have cardinal utilities that reect their attitudes toward risk, deter-
mine marginal utilities up to scaling. Mariotti (1997), for example, considers a context in
which interpersonal comparisons of utility are meaningful; that is, there exists an (unknown)
rescaling of each persons utility which makes utilities interpersonally comparable." At the
same time, however, "interpersonal comparisons of utility are not feasible." Assume there is
a correct interpersonal utility scaling, but DM cannot determine it. Can she guarantee that
for this unknown scaling both symmetry and Pareto are satised? They would have to be
satised for all potential scalings. Mariotti establishes that the NBS is the only criterion
with this property.
Even more appealing is an interpretation of the NBS as the fairest allocation that is
related to Gauthiers (1986) principle of "moral by agreement": Trying to assess what is
fair, but nding herself unable to compare utilities across individuals, DM might refer to the
prediction of a symmetric mechanism for generating allocations. In particular, DMmight ask
what would be the allocation if both she and the recipient were to bargain over the division
of the surplus. To answer this question, she does not need to assume the intensities of the
two preferences. This is a procedural interpretation that is not built on the axioms: DM is
not ashamed of payo¤s, but of using her stronger position in distributing the gains. It is,
21Even though u and v1 do not have to agree, our interpretation might be more convincing when they
resemble each other empirically. In particular it is more appealing if DMs actual utility from self-payo¤ u
is unbounded.
22This reasoning leads Rawls (1971) to suggest Pareto and Symmetry as the two criteria a decision maker
under a veil of ignorance should respect.
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then, the intuitive and possibly descriptive appeal of the NBS in many bargaining situations
that makes it normatively appealing to DM in our context.23 Theorem 3 establishes the
behavioral equivalence of this interpretation and our axioms.
The Pareto and the Solvability axioms, F2 and F3 respectively, rule out fairness rankings
with (x; 0) f (0; y) for all x, y. In particular the Nash product with linear utility functions
v1, v2 is ruled out as a criterion for fairness. Such orderings could easily be accommodated by
posing Pareto and Solvability only on R2++. As a consequence, ' would be strictly increasing
only on R2++ and v1, v2 would only have to be weakly positive, v1; v2 : R+ ! R+.24 These
weaker axioms would still rule out the Maximin as a criterion for fairness.
Remark: Any concern DM has about fairness originates from being observed. Consequently,
DM should expect a potentially anonymous observer to share her notion of what is fair: Her
private norm of fairness, which we observe indirectly, should reect her concern about not
violating a social norm. If the observed choice situation is anonymous, DM does not know
the recipients identity and is aware that the recipient does not know hers. Therefore, the
ranking cannot depend on either identity. Combining this with the idea that fairness of an
allocation should not depend on the role a person plays, whether dictator or recipient, one
might want to pose symmetry of the fairness ranking in terms of direct payo¤s.
F5 (Symmetry) (a1; a2) f (a2; a1).
Adding this assumption constrains v1 (a) = v2 (a) in the representation of Theorem 3.
The numerical example given in the introduction features the combination of Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3, where all functions involved are the identity. For brevity, we will not repeat it
here.
5. Multiple Recipients and an Application
In order to expand the range of possible applications of our representation, we rst extend
our results to nitely many agents.
23The descriptive value of the NBS has been tested empirically. For a discussion see Davis and Holt (1993)
pages 247-55. Further, multiple seemingly natural implementations of it have been proposed (Nash [1953] ,
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]).
24As can be seen in the proof of Theorem 2, this would imply the possibility of ( 1; 1) as an imaginary
disagreement point, which corresponds to DM imagining that players have to nd an agreement (innite
cost of disagreement).
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5.1. Multiple Recipients
The underlying idea is that DM (without loss of generality individual 1) is concerned about
N   1 > 2 other individuals, whose payo¤s depend on her choice. In analogy to section 2,
let K be the set of all nite subsets of RN+ . Any element A 2 K is a nite set of alternatives.
A typical alternative a = (a1; a2; :::; aN) is interpreted as a payo¤ vector, where an is the
payo¤ allocated to individual n. We write, for example, (am; an; a m;n) as the alternative
with payo¤ am to individual m, payo¤ an to individual n and a m;n 2 RN 2+ lists all other
individualspayo¤s in order. We endow K with the topology generated by the Hausdor¤
metric.
Let  be a continuous preference relation over K. Most of the axioms we pose on  in
section 2 can be readily applied to  on this new domain. We dene f in analogy to the
previous denition. Instead of F3 we write
FN3 (Weak Solvability) If (an;0) f b then for all m 6= n, there exists am such that
(am; an;0) f b.
The axiom states that it is always possible to equate the fairness of an allocation with
payo¤ to only one individual to that of an initially fairer allocation by giving appropriate
payo¤s to any second individual. This property requires the fairness ranking never to be
satiated in any individual payo¤.
Denition: The pair of possible payo¤s to individuals m and n is Preferentially Indepen-
dent with respect to its Complement (P.I.C.), if the fairness ranking in the (am; an)-space is
independent of a m;n.
FN4 (Pairwise Preferential Independence) For all m;n 2 f1; ::; Ng, the pair of possible
payo¤s to individuals m and n is P.I.C.
Similarly to F4, this axiom must hold if the contribution of one persons marginal private
payo¤ to the fairness of an allocation cannot depend on another persons private payo¤ level.
Theorem 4 Assume N  3 and that DM is susceptible to shame.
(i)  and f satisfy P1   P5 and F1; F2 and FN3 respectively, if and only if there exist con-
tinuous and strictly increasing functions u : R+ ! R and ' : RN+ ! R such that the function
U : K ! R dened as U (A) = max
a2A
[u (a1) + ' (a1; a2; :::; an)] max
b2A
[' (b1; b2; :::; bn)] repre-
sents  and ' represents f .
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(ii) f also satises FN4 if and only if there exist continuous and strictly increasing functions
v1; ::; vN : R+ ! R++, where v1; ::; vN are unbounded such that ' (a) =
NQ
i1
vi (ai) :
If DM is not susceptible to shame, ' is constant.
Theorem 4 is analogous to Theorem 2. For the proof, note that the analogue of Theorem
1 can be established by substituting a 1 for a2 in the theorem and in the proof, where now
' : RN+ ! R. To establish the analogue of Theorem 3, namely that there are N increas-
ing unbounded functions v1; ::; vN , such that the fairness ranking f can be represented by
' (a) =
NQ
i1
vi (ai) if and only if it satises F1; F2; FN3 and F
N
4 , we rst state a stronger version
of FN3 :
FN 03 (Solvability) If (an; a n) f b then for all m 6= n, there exists am such that
(am; an; a m;n) f b:
We observe that Continuity, F1, F2 and FN3 imply Solvability. To see this, assume
(an; a n) f b. By F2, (an;0) f (an; a n) and hence (using F1) (an;0) f b. By FN3 ,
there exists eam such that (eam; an;0) f b. By F2 again, (eam; an; z) f b for all z 2 RN 2+ .
Therefore, by Continuity, there must be am 2 R+ for which (am; an; a m;n) f b. We can
then apply:
Theorem (Luce and Tukey [1964]) Pairwise Preferential Independence and Solvabil-
ity imply the existence of an additive representation of f .
The proof of this theorem can be found in Kranz et al (1971). We illustrate the idea for
the case N = 3 by showing that FN4 implies F4 for (without loss of generality) the pair of
individuals 1 and 2, independent of the payo¤ to individual 3:
For any (a01; a
0
2; a
0
3) and any a
1
1, dene a
1
2 and a
1
3 such that 
a11; a
0
2; a
0
3
 f  a01; a12; a03 f  a01; a02; a13 .
Applying FN4 twice implies that 
a11; a
1
2; a
0
3
 f  a11; a02; a13 f  a01; a12; a13 .
19
For any a21, dene a
2
2 and a
2
3 such that 
a21; a
0
2; a
0
3
 f  a01; a22; a03 f  a01; a02; a23 f  a11; a12; a03 .
We have to show that (a21; a
1
2; a3) f (a11; a22; a3) for any value of a3: (a21; a02; a03) f (a11; a02; a13),
so by FN4 also (a
2
1; a
1
2; a
0
3) f (a11; a12; a13). Similarly (a01 ; a22; a03) f (a01 ; a12; a13), so by FN4 also
(a11 ; a
2
2; a
0
3) f (a11 ; a12; a13). Using transitivity, (a21; a12; a03) f (a11; a22; a03) and by FN4 this is
independent of a03. Hence (a
2
1; a
1
2; a3) f (a11; a22; a3) for any value of a3.
The existence of utility functions according to which f is represented by the Nash
product follows, as before, where additivity is implied by Luce and Tukeys theorem. We
gave the intuition for the remainder of the proof of Theorem 4 after stating Theorem 2.
5.2. An Application to Obfuscation by a Social Decision Maker
It is often argued that individuals who make social choices are faced with very rigid con-
straints. Shame at acting against the interests of others could be one such constraint,
moderating individualsdecisions as compared to their selsh interest. We build on this
interpretation to explain why a social decision maker may implement policies with relatively
opaque consequences. To rst illustrate by simple example why such lack of transparency
(or obfuscation) might be valuable to DM at all, consider an indivisible good that can be
assigned to one individual. All individuals have the same probability of needing it the most.
Under obfuscation, this uncertainty never gets resolved, hence all allocations are equally fair
and DM can take the good for herself without shame. If, on the other hand, the uncertainty
does get resolved before DM chooses an allocation, she can only claim the good without
shame in the event that she values it the most.
The literature that studies obfuscation in policy making usually considers redistribu-
tive policies. As an example, Tullock (1983) uses the decision of where to locate a new
road: Depending on the roads location, some citizens will gain, others might lose. These
consequences will not be entirely transparent at the time of decision making.
While building a road in a certain location clearly has a redistributive component, we
assert that it may also generate value for the society as a whole. In this section, we therefore
consider more general policies, which carry both an uncertain social value and an uncertain
distribution of gains among citizens. All citizens (including DM) have identical information
with respect to both types of uncertainty at every stage of the process.25 Evaluating policies
requires some degree of public deliberation, for example, the consultation of experts. Before
25This assumption stands in contrast to the usual asymmetric-information assumption (either among citi-
zens or between citizens and DM), that is used to explain the choice among di¤erent methods of redistribution.
See, for example, Coate and Morris (1995) and a survey in Wittman (1989).
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this deliberation takes place, DM can limit the degree to which deliberation will resolve
uncertainty. She does so by choosing the transparency level of the policies that will be
considered.26 We assume that even for the lowest feasible transparency level, deliberation
will reveal DMs selsh payo¤ from each relevant policy. This assumption is intuitive due to
DMs arguably exposed role. It is also appropriate when addressing DM, who is constrained
by shame. Finally, it is crucial for the results established below, as the assumption introduces
an asymmetry between DM and all other citizens despite the information structure assumed
above: The probability that DMs preferences will become public is larger than that of any
other citizens. Therefore, when deciding on the transparency of policies, DM has to trade
o¤ the benet of obfuscation, which makes selsh choices seem more fair, and the value of
transparency, which reveals e¢ cient choices as such.
The time sequence is as follows: Firstly, DM chooses the transparency level for the policies
under consideration. Secondly, public deliberation symmetrically reduces the uncertainty
about the consequences of those policies. The higher the transparency level was set, the less
uncertainty remains. Lastly, DM chooses one policy. It is important to note that, in slight
contrast to our model, stage-one choice does not alter, in terms of expected payo¤s, the set
of policies that are relevant for stage-two choice. Instead, it alters the expected di¤erential
in fairness between the policies in which DM will have a selsh interest, and those that will
be perceived as fairest.
Formally, consider a very large population of N individuals indexed by i. Let 
 = R
be identied both as the set of possible policy choices a 2 
 and as the type space. When
referring to a particular individual i, we denote her type as xi 2 
. Individual is selsh
preferences are commonly known to be represented by u : R+ ! R+, which is continuous and
strictly decreasing with the (standard Euclidian) distance, d (a; xi), between the implemented
policy a and her type xi. Types are identically and independently distributed according to
a Normal distribution with an unknown mean,  2 R, and known variance 2 > 0. The
(conjugate) common prior distribution of  is Normal,   N

0; 20

, where 20 := 
2 and,
without loss of generality, 0 = 0. Thus,  captures the uncertainty about the redistributive
consequences of policies, while  relates to the uncertainty about the value generated for
society as a whole. Let 
n be the set of all possible type proles of length n  N , with a
typical element xn = (x1; ::; xn). Upon observing the realization xn 2 
n, each individual,
including DM, updates her beliefs according to Bayesrule. The resulting common posterior
distribution of  is Normal as well,   N

n; 2n

, with n =
2(x1+:::+xn)
2+n2
and 2n =
22
2+n2
.
26For example, DM can set the agenda of issues she wants to address: Instead of debating the location of
the road, she could also choose to deliberate introducing a tax. The individual consequences of the tax are
presumably more transparent than those of the location of the road.
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Note that x1 2 xn. Since we identify DM as individual 1, her type is always revealed for
n  1.
After the entire population observes xn, DMmakes a social choice a 2 
. We assume that
DMs preferences satisfy P1 P5 as well as F1; F2; FN3 and FN4 . As is implied by Theorem 4,
DM would like to choose a to maximize
u (d (a; x1)) + N
NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) max
b2


N
NQ
i=1
u (d (b; xi))

,
where, for simplicity, we assume h to be linear (h (x) = Nx). After observing x
n, however,
xn+1; :::; xN remain unknown, so
NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) cannot be evaluated. To accommodate the
uncertainty about the distribution of types in the population, we assume instead that the
expected fairness of an allocation conditional on xn,
E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

is what determines shame. Thus, the relevant characteristics of a policy are both its proximity
d (a; x1) to DMs type x1 and its expected fairness. According to our representation, the
action that the public perceives as the fairest is
a := argmax
a2

E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

.
DMs choice is then governed by maximizing the term
u (d (a; x1)) + N

E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

  E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

.
Note that for xed n and large population size, N !1, a  ! n.
Before xn is observed by both DM and the public, DM can pick n 2 [1; n], n << N . The
number n is interpreted as the transparency level of policies in 
: The more transparent
the policies are, the larger the number of individuals whose type becomes revealed by the
public deliberation. Di¤erent transparency levels n introduce di¤erent distributions over
expected fairness, while leaving d (a; xi) unchanged. Thus, the choice of n is equivalent to
stage-one choice of di¤erent distributions over menus with the same cardinality that di¤er in
the expected fairness of their elements. In contrast to the policy choice, we assume that the
choice of the transparency level, n, is free of shame.27 This assumption could rest on the fact
27Due to this assumption, the model nicely ts our general framework.
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that the transparency level is chosen before any uncertainty is resolved and, hence, cannot
bias the ex post expected fairness of any policy. Alternatively, the public might simply be
unaware of transparency as a choice dimension.
We are interested in nding the optimal transparency level, that is, the optimal rst-
stage choice according to DMs selsh preferences. DM faces the following trade-o¤: On
the one hand, she benets from high transparency, which reduces the uncertainty about the
fairness of policies and allows the public to interpret fair choices as such. On the other
hand, she benets from low transparency, as it gives her selsh payo¤more weight in public
observation, limiting the publics ability to detect selsh behavior.
To determine DMs optimal transparency choice, n, dene the ratio of the standard
deviations  and  as s := 

and let s = s solve 2 + 3s2   3s4   6s6   2s8 = 0, s  0:84.
Ignoring the integer constraint on n, we state:
Proposition n (s) exists and is unique. For s < s, m = n (s) is the solution to
2 + (2m+ 1) s2   3s4   2 (2m+ 1) s6   m (m+ 1) s8 = 0, which is decreasing in s. For
s  s, n (s) = 1.
Note that the optimal transparency level does not depend on DMs susceptibility to
shame, N .
28 This means that while for the case of a standard economic agent with N = 0,
the choice of n is arbitrary, even a small positive N implies the same unique amount
of obfuscation as an arbitrarily large N does. Note as well that absolute uncertainty is
irrelevant for the optimal transparency choice, only relative uncertainty s = 

matters. This
makes the prediction of the proposition very robust.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix. It establishes that DMs utility is
decreasing in the absolute value of the random variable Xn := n   x1, and that Xn is
normally distributed. Then p(jXnj=z)
p(jXmj=z) can be shown to satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property (MLRP). Since DMs utility is decreasing in z, she strictly prefers m over n if and
only if p(jXnj=z)
p(jXmj=z) is increasing in z. Assuming n > m, we nd, with some straightforward
algebra, that this is the case if and only if 2 + (m+ n) s2   3s4   2 (m+ n) s6  mns8 < 0.
Thus DM has well-dened preferences over levels of transparency, n, and these preferences
depend only on s. We then establish that n (s) is unique and for s < s is also decreasing. As
a result, if DM prefers n = 1 to n = 2, then n (s) = 1 is her globally preferred transparency
level. If she prefers n to both n  1 and n+1, then n (s) = n is her globally preferred level.
28The proposition is only concerned with the transparency choice. The allocation DM chooses in the
second stage obviously does depend on N , as it determines the extent to which DM yields to shame at the
cost of her selsh interest.
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Figure 2: n as a function of s.
Before interpreting this proposition, consider again the trade-o¤ DM faces: Since her
utility is decreasing in the random variable jXnj :=
n   x1, she would like the mean of the
public posterior on types to be as close as possible to her type. Since DMs type is always
observed (and thus always a¤ects the posterior), it has a higher expected weight in the
posterior than any other citizens, which is only observed with probability n 1
N
. The lower
n is, the greater the advantage DM has over other citizens. Lowering n, however, increases
the weight that the common prior gets in the public posterior. Since types are correlated,
this is not in DMs interest. Now consider the proposition in the context of this trade-o¤:
DM prefers to consider more opaque policies for the future if the standard deviation of the
distribution of benets across the population, measured by , becomes larger compared to
the uncertainty about which policy is socially optimal, which is measured by . Intuitively,
in this case she is concerned about the situation where her selsh preferences conict with
considerations of fairness. Therefore, she would like her own selsh preferences to impact
the public posterior as much as possible. Since her preferences always become public, she
would like other citizenspreferences to remain unobserved. Conversely, she prefers more
transparent policies if the uncertainty is more about the socially optimal policy and less
about the distribution of gains. In this case, she is mostly concerned about the situation
where her selsh preferences are in line with considerations of fairness but an uninformed
public would perceive her as selsh if she chose accordingly. Figure 2 shows n (s).
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6. Related Literature
Other-regarding preferences have been considered extensively in economic literature. In
particular, inequality aversion as studied by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is based on an objective
function with a similar structure to the representation of second-stage choice in Theorem 3.29
Both works attach a cost to any deviation from choosing the fairest alternative. In Fehr and
Schmidts work, the fairest allocation need not be feasible and is independent of the choice
situation. In our work, the fairest allocation is always a feasible choice and it is identied
through the axioms. This dependence of the fairest allocation on the choice situation allows
us to distinguish observed from unobserved choice.
The idea that there may be a discrepancy between DMs preference to behave pro-
sociallyand her desire to be viewed as behaving pro-socially is not new to economic litera-
ture. For a model thereof, see Benabou and Tirole (2006).
Neilsons (2006-b) work is motivated by the same experimental evidence as ours. He
also considers menus of allocations as objects of choice. Neilson does not axiomatize a
representation result, but points out how choices among menus should relate to choices from
menus, if shame were the relevant motive. He relates the two aspects of shame that also
underlie the Set Betweenness property in our work; DM might prefer a smaller menu over a
larger menu either because avoiding shame compels her to be generous when choosing from
the larger menu, or because being selsh when choosing from the larger menu bears the cost
of shame.
The structure of our representation resembles the representation of preferences with self-
control under temptation, as axiomatized in GP. GP study preferences over sets of lotteries
and show that their axioms lead to a representation of the following form:
UGP (A) = max
a2A

uGP (a) + vGP (a)
	 max
b2A

vGP (b)
	
with uGP and vGP both linear in the probabilities and where A is now a set of lotteries. In
their context, uGP represents the "commitment"- and vGP the "temptation"-ranking. While
the two works yield representations with a similar structure, their domains - and therefore
the axioms - are di¤erent. In particular, the objects in GPs work are sets of lotteries. They
impose the independence axiom and indi¤erence to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.
This allows them to identify the representation above that consists of two functions that are
linear in the probabilities. Each of these functions is an expected utility functional. The
objects in our work, in contrast, are sets of allocations and there is no uncertainty. The
29Neilson (2006-a) axiomatizes a reference-dependent preference, that can be interpreted in terms of Fehr
and Schmidts objective function.
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natural way to introduce uncertainty to our model is to treat our representation as the
utility function, which should be used to calculate the expected utility of lotteries over
sets. Therefore, DM would typically not be indi¤erent to the timing of the resolution of
uncertainty.30 However, one of GPs axioms is the Set Betweenness axiom, A < B ) A <
A [ B < B. We show that our axioms Strong Left Betweenness (P2), Shame (P3) and
Fairness Ranking (F1) imply Set Betweenness. Hence, GPs Lemma 2 can be employed,
allowing us to conne attention to sets with only two elements.
Our model is positive in nature, but it is interesting to contrast moral or normative
elements in its interpretation with those in the context of the temptation literature: In a
work related to GP, Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2005) write: ...by temptationwe mean
that the agent has some view of what is normatively correct, what she should do, but has
other, conicting desires which must be reconciled with the normative view in some fashion.
According to this interpretation, the commitment ranking is given a normative value. In our
work, shame is based on deviating from some fairness norm that tells DM what she should
do. This norm conicts with DMs selsh commitment ranking.
Empirically, the assumption that only two elements of a choice set matter for the magni-
tude of shame (the fairest available alternative and the chosen alternative) is clearly simpli-
fying: Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (2004) observe that dictators choose to make much
smaller transfers when their choice set includes an unattractive lottery. In other words, the
availability of an unattractive allocation seems to lessen the incentive to share.
Lastly, it is necessary to qualify our leading example: The experimental evidence on the
e¤ect of (anonymous) observation on the level of giving in dictator games is by no means
conclusive. Behavior tends to depend crucially on surroundings, like the social proximity of
the group of subjects and the phrasing of the instructions, as, for example, Bolton, Katok
and Zwick (1994); Burnham (2003); and Haley and Fessler (2005) record. On the one hand,
there is more evidence in favor of our interpretation: In a follow-up to the experiment cited
in the introduction, Dana et al (2006) verify that dictators do not exit the game if second-
stage choice is also unobserved. Similarly, Pillutla and Murningham (1995) nd evidence
that peoples giving behavior under anonymity depends on the information given to the
observing recipient. In experiments related to our leading example, Lazear, Malmendier and
Weber (2005) as well as Broberg, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) even predict and nd
that the most generous dictators are keenest to avoid an environment where they could share
with an observing recipient.31 Broberg et al further elicit the price subjects are willing to
pay in order to exit the dictator game, nding that the mean exit reservation price equals
30In section 5.2 we account for uncertainty, which can be translated into uncertainty over sets.
31This nicely underlines our interpretation of "shame" as a motive.
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82% of the dictator game endowment. On the other hand, this is in contrast to evidence
collected by Koch and Normann (2005), who claim that altruistic behavior persists at an
almost unchanged level when observability is credibly reduced. Similarly, Johannesson and
Persson (2000) nd that incomplete anonymity - not observability - is what keeps people from
being selsh. Ultimately, experiments aimed at eliciting a norm share the same problem:
Since people use di¤erent (and potentially contradictory) norms in di¤erent contexts, it is
unclear whether the laboratory environment triggers a di¤erent set of norms than would
other situations: Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Moore (2000) point out that money might
become a measure of success rather than a direct asset in the competition-like laboratory
environment, such that the norm might be "do well" rather than "do not be selsh."32 More
theoretically, Miller (1999) suggests that the phrasing of instructions might determine which
norm is invoked. For example, the reason that Koch and Normann do not nd an e¤ect
of observability might be that their thorough explanation of anonymity induces a change
in the regime of norms, in e¤ect telling people "be rational," which might be interpreted
as "be selsh." Then being observed might have no e¤ect on people who, under di¤erent
circumstances, might have been ashamed to be selsh.
7. Conclusion
We study a decision maker who cares about otherswell-being only when being observed.
We term the motive that distinguishes choice behavior when observed from choice when
unobserved "shame." Theorem 1 features a representation that captures the tension between
the interest to maximize private payo¤ and the shame that results from not choosing the
fairest alternative within a set. Theorem 2 identies a set-independent choice criterion
with the help of a separability axiom. If there is a set-independent choice criterion, the
representation should be more tractable for applications. More importantly, the separability
assumption provides a criterion on preferences over sets to decide whether or not the period-
two choice of alternatives might look as if it was generated by an altruistic concern. In
Theorem 3 we further specify the norm of fairness. We show that the fairest alternative in a
set can be interpreted as the Nash Bargaining Solution of an associated game. Because the
utility functions used to generate this game are private, so is the norm. The most appealing
interpretation relies on the descriptive power of the NBS in many bargaining situations,
giving it normative appeal as the solution to a symmetric mechanism. Lastly, Theorem 4
extends Theorem 2 to situations where DM faces multiple other individuals whose welfare
32Surely the opposite is also conceivable: Subjects might be particularly keen to be seless when the
experimentor observes their behavior. This example is just ment to draw attention to the di¢ culties faced
by experimenters in the context of norms.
27
depends on her choice. We apply our model to a social decision maker, whose selsh utility
is correlated with fairness. She faces a trade-o¤ when choosing the transparency of her
policies: Being more transparent makes it easier for the public to perceive fair choices as
such, while less transparency makes it harder for society to detect selsh choices. In our
setup, the optimal transparency level is unique and is independent of DMs susceptibility to
shame.
Let us conclude with another experiment to suggest how to incorporate uncertainty into
our model. Dana, Weber and Kuang (2005) make a dictator face a choice between $5 and
$6 for herself. An anonymous recipient will receive either $5 or $1. Which recipient payo¤
is paired with which dictator payo¤ is determined by a coin ip. The dictator can reveal
(without being observed) the outcome of the coin ip prior to her decision. The authors nd
that many dictators choose not to reveal the outcome. This action seems weakly dominated,
because whether or not the dictator is willing to give up $1 in order to give the recipient the
extra $4, knowing whether such a trade-o¤ is necessary should not hurt DM. We propose
to interpret the revealed and the unrevealed conditions as two di¤erent choice situations.
If all functions in the combination of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are identities, and if DM
subscribes to the vNM axioms, the utilities to be compared are
U (f(6; 3) ; (5; 3)g) = 6
versus
1
2
U (f(6; 5) ; (5; 1)g) + 1
2
U (f(6; 1) ; (5; 5)g) = 1
2
6 +
1
2
5 = 5:5
This could explain the observed behavior. However, since in the experiment the recipient
knows the full instructions and does not observe DMs decision to reveal, observability would
require a more involved interpretation. To ease the application of our model, it would be
interesting to see how the subjects behavior changes if the recipient is only told the infor-
mation DM has after her decision to reveal or not.
8. Appendix
8.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Let U : K ! R be a continuous function that represents . Dene u (a1)  U (f(a1; 0)g). By
P1, u (a1) = U (f(a1; a2)g) independent of a2, with u (a1) continuous and strictly increasing.
Let ' : R2+ ! R be a continuous function that represents f .By F2, ' is also strictly
increasing.
28
Claim 1.1 (Right Betweenness): A  B ) A [B  B.
Proof: There are two cases to consider:
Case 1) 8a 2 A; 9b 2 B such that b f a. Let A =

a1; a2:::; aN
	
and C0 = B. Dene
Cn = Cn 1 [ fang for n = 1; 2; ::; N . According to F1, there exists b 2 B such that an f b.
By P3, Cn 1  Cn. By negative transitivity of , C0  CN or A [B  B.
Case 2) 9a 2 A such that a f b; 8b 2 B. Let B =

b1;b2:::;bM
	
. Dene C0 = A and
Cm = Cm 1 [ fbmg for m = 1; 2; ::;M . By P3, 8C such that a 2 C, C  C [ fbmg. Hence,
Cm 1  Cm. By negative transitivity of , C0  CM or A[B  A  B, hence A[B  B.k
Combining Claim 1.1 with P2 guarantees Set Betweenness (SB): A  B ) A  A[B 
B. Having established Set Betweenness, we can apply GP Lemma 2, which states that any
set is indi¤erent to a specic two-element subset of it.
Lemma 1.1 (GP Lemma 2): If  satises SB, then for any nite set A, there exist a;b 2 A
such that A  fa;bg, (a;b) solves max
a02A
min
b02A
U (fa0;b0g) and (b; a) solves min
b02A
max
a02A
U (fa0;b0g).
Dene f : R2+  R2+ ! R such that f (a;b) = u (a1)  eU (a;b), where eU : R2+  R2+ ! R is
a function satisfying:
U (fa;bg) = max
a02fa;bg
min
b02fa;bg
eU (a0;b0) = min
b02fa;bg
max
a02fa;bg
eU (a0;b0) :33
By denition we have f (a; a) = 0 for every a 2 R2+. Note as well that
fag  fa;bg ) f (a;b) > 0,
as otherwise we would have:
U (fa;bg) = max

u (a1) max

f(a;a)=0
f(a;b)
	
u (b1) max

f(b;a)
f(b;b)=0
	  u (a1) maxf (a; a) = 0
f (a;b)

= U (fag) .
For a decision maker who is not susceptible to shame, U (fa;bg) = max fu (a1) ; u (b1)g.
Hence setting f (a;b)  0 is consistent with her preferences. The following claims help us
to further identify f for a decision maker who is susceptible to shame.
33Note that max
a2A
min
b2A
U (fa;bg) = max
a2A
min
b2A

max
a02fa;bg
min
b02fa;bg
eU  a0;b0 = max
a2A
min
b2A
eU (a;b).
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Claim 1.2: (i) [' (a) < ' (b) and a1 > b1], fag  fa;bg
(ii) [' (a) < ' (b) and a1  b1]) fag  fa;bg
(iii) [' (a) = ' (b) and a1 > b1]) fag  fa;bg  fbg.
Proof: (i) If ' (b) > ' (a) then there exists A such that a 2 A and A  A [ fbg. As
a1 > b1 , fag  fbg, by P2 fag  fa;bg. Conversely if fag  fa;bg, then b f a and
hence ' (a) < ' (b). Further from SB and P1, a1 > b1.
(ii) If a1  b1 then by SB fbg  fa;bg. Since ' (b) > ' (a), there is no B such that
b 2 B and B  B [ fag, hence fbg  fa;bg.
(iii) By P1 fag  fbg and SB fag  fa;bg. As ' (a) = ' (b), using (i) we have
fag  fa;bg.k
Let (a (A) ;b (A)) be the solution of
max
a02A
min
b02A
U (fa0;b0g)
so (b (A) ; a (A)) solves min
b02A
max
a02A
U (fa0;b0g).
Claim 1.3: There exists b 2 argmax
a02A
' (a0) such that A  fa0;bg for some a0 2 A and
b (A) = b.
Proof: Assume not, then there exist a; c such that A  fa; cg, (a; c) = (a (A) ;b (A)).
Therefore,
fa;bg  fa; cg  fa;b; cg  A348b 2 argmax
a02A
' (a0)
and hence c f b, which is a contradiction.k
For the remainder of the proof, let If (') := fb0 : ' (b0) = 'g. That is, If (' (b)) is the
f equivalence class of b. Dene
Y (a; ') = fb0 2 If (') : fag  fa;b0g  fb0gg
We make the following four observations:
(1) fag  fa;bg  fbg, fag  fa; cg and b f c imply fa; cg  fa;bg.
(2) fag  fa;bg  fbg, fag  fa; cg  fcg and b f c imply fa; cg  fa;bg.
34Note that if (a; c) ((c;a)) solves the maximin- (minimax-) problem over A, it clearly solves this problem
over the subset fa;b; cg for all b 2 An fa; cg.
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(3) b 2 Y (a; ') , b0 f b and fbg  fb0g imply b0 2 Y (a; ').
(4) If fag  fa;bg  fbg , fb0g  fbg and b0 2 If (' (b)), then either fa;b0g  fa;bg 
fb0g or fa;b0g  fb0g  fa;bg.
To verify these observations, suppose rst that (1) did not hold. Then fa;bg  fa; cg and
fa;bg  fbg, hence by SB fa;bg  fa;b; cg and therefore c f b, which is a contradiction.
If (2) did not hold, we would get a contradiction to b f c immediately. Next suppose that
(3) did not hold. Then fag  fa;bg  fbg  fb0g  fa;b0g. Note that by SB fbg  fb;b0g
and, applying SB again , fbg  fa;b;b0g. But then fa;bg  fa;b;b0g, contradicting
b0 f b. To verify (4), assume fa;b0g  fb0g. Then by Claim 1.2 (i) fag  fa;b0g  fb0g
and then by observation (2) fa;b0g  fa;bg. If on the other hand fa;b0g  fb0g, then
if fa;bg  fa;b0g, fa;bg  fbg and SB imply fa;bg  fa;b;b0g, a contradiction to b0
2 If (' (b)). Note that by Claim 1.3 we cannot have fb0g  fa;b0g.k
Next we claim that ' (b) is a su¢ cient statistic for the impact of b on a two element set.
Claim 1.4: There exits a function eU satisfying the condition specied above such that
' (b) > ' (a) implies f (a;b) = g (a; ' (b)), where g : R2+  R ! R is weakly increasing in
its second argument.
Proof: Such eU exists, if and only if f (a;b) = g (a; ' (b)) is consistent with  . Therefore
it is enough to consider the constraints  puts on f . Given a and b, look at all c such that
' (b) > ' (c). We should show that f (a;b)  f (a; c).
First note that if ' (b)  ' (a)  ' (c), then f (a;b)  0  f (a; c) is consistent with .
If ' (a)  ' (b) > ' (c), then 0  f (a;b)  f (a; c) is consistent with . If a1 = 0, then
f (a;b)  f (a; c)  0 is consistent with . Therefore, conne attention to the case where
a1 > 0 and ' (b) > ' (c) > ' (a).
By Claim 1.2 (i), F2 and F3, there exists b0 2 If (' (b)) such that fag  fa;b0g. Thus,
there are two cases to consider:
1) Y (a; ' (b)) 6= ;.
2) Y (a; ' (b)) = ;.
Case 1) Suppose Y (a; ' (b)) 6= ;. Dene f (a;b) := f (a;b0) for some b0 2 Y (a; ' (b))
(note that by observation (2) f (a;b0) = f (a;b00) 8b0;b00 2 Y (a; ' (b)) and using ob-
servations (3) and (4), this denition is consistent with .) If Y (a; ' (c)) 6= ; then
by observation (1) fa; cg  fa;bg and hence f (a;b)  f (a; c). If Y (a; ' (c)) = ;
then 8c0 2 If (c), fa; c0g  fc0g. By F2 and continuity of f , there exists c0 2 If (c)
with c01 < b
0
1 for some b
0 2 Y (a; ' (b)). Then by Claim 1.1, P1 and observation (1)
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fag  fa; c0g  fa;bg  fbg  fcg, so c0 2 Y (a; ' (c)). Contradiction.
Case 2) Suppose Y (a; ' (b)) = ;. Dene f (a;b) := u (a1)   u (0). If Y (a; ' (c)) 6= ;,
then f (a; c) < u (a1) = f (a;b). If Y (a; ' (c)) = ; then f (a; c) = u (a1) = f (a;b).k
Let S := f(a; ') : Y (a; ') 6= ;g. Note that S is an open set.
Claim 1.5: There is g (a; '), which is continuous.
Proof : If Y (a; ') 6= ;, then g (a; ') = u (a1)   U (fa;bg) for some b 2 Y (a; '), and
is clearly continuous. If Y (a; ') = ;, then '  ' (a) implies g (a; ')  0, while ' > ' (a)
implies g (a; ')  u (a1)   u (0). Dene a switch point (ba; b') to be a boundary point of S
such that there exists bb 2 R2+ with 'bb = b'. For b' = ' (ba) dene g (ba; b') := 0 and forb' > ' (ba) dene g (ba; b') := u (ba1)  u (0).
Consider a sequence f(an; 'n)g ! (ba; b') in S. Pick a sequence fbn0g with bn0 2
Y (an; 'n)8n. Dene fbn1g =
n
min
h
1
n
; bn01 ;bb1io. Dene bn2 to be a solution to ' (bn1 ; bn2 ) = 'n.
By F2 and F3 , bn2 is well dened. Note that by observation (3) b
n = (bn1 ; b
n
2 ) 2 Y (an; 'n).
Lastly, let bbn1  bn1 and bbn2 be the solution to 'bbn1 ;bbn2 = b'. We have U (fan;bng) =
u (an1 )   g (an; 'n). If in the switch point b' = ' (ba), then U nba; bbno = u (ba1). By conti-
nuity, U (fan;bng)  U
nba; bbno !
n!1
0, hence
lim
n!1
g (an; 'n) = lim
n!1
[u (an1 )  u (ba1)] = u (ba1)  u (ba1) = 0 = g (ba; b') :
If in the switch point b' > ' (ba), then U nba; bbno = ubbn1 = u (bn1 ). By the same
continuity argument
lim
n!1
g (an; 'n) = lim
n!1
[u (an1 )  u (bn1 )] = u (ba1)  u (0) = g (ba; b') :
For ' < ' (a) let g (a; ') < 0. This satises the constraint on f . So g can be continuous
in both arguments and increasing in ' and such that for any sequence f(an; 'n)g in S, with
f(an; 'n)g ! (ba; b') , we have lim
n!1
g (an; 'n) = 0.k
That the representation satises the axioms is easy to verify. This completes the proof
of Theorem 1.35
35If F2 and F3 were only posed on R2++ as suggested in section 3, we would have to choose bb1 > 0 and
bn1 > 0 to use these axioms. This is possible for any switch point other than (ba; b') = (0; ' (0)), for which
continuity can be established easily.
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8.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 (i) are analogous, where Theorem 2 covers the case N = 2, while
Theorem 4 (i) covers the case N  3. We prove Theorem 4 (i) below by rst establishing
that the analogous version of Theorem 1 holds. From there on the proof of Theorem 2 is
identical to the proof of Theorem 4 (i), with a2 substituted for a 1.
8.3. Proof of Theorem 3
Luce and Tukey [1964] prove the necessity and su¢ ciency of Solvability (which is implied
by Negative Transitivity, Weak Solvability, Pareto and Continuity (apply corollary 1 in the
text to the case N=2)) and the Corresponding Trade-o¤s Condition (the label they use for
F4 ) to admit an additive representation.36 To see how a proof works, consider the Lock-Step
Procedure,37 as illustrated by Figure 3:
By F2, f indi¤erence curves are downward sloping and continuous. Fix (a01; a02) and
a12 > a
0
2. Recursively construct a ight of stairs between the indi¤erence curves through
(a01; a
0
2) and (a
0
1; a
1
2).
In the direction of increasing a2 (and hence decreasing a1) :
an1 solves (a
n
1 ; a
n
2 ) f (a01; a02) . F3 guarantees that a solution exists whenever
(0; an2 ) f (a01; a02). If (0; an2 ) f (a01; a02), the ight of stairs terminates.
an+12 solves
 
an1 ; a
n+1
2
 f (a01; a12). A solution exists by F3, as (an1 ; 0) f (a01; a12) by F2.
In the direction of decreasing a2 (and increasing a1):
a n1 solves
 
a n1 ; a
 n+1
2
 f (a01; a12). A solution exists by F3, as  0; a n+12  f (a01; a12) by
F2.
a n2 solves
 
a n1 ; a
 n
2
 f (a01; a02). F3 guarantees that a solution exists whenever 
a n1 ; 0
 f (a01; a02). If  a n1 ; 0 f (a01; a02), the ight of stairs terminates.
By construction
 
an+11 ; a
n+2
2
 f  an1 ; an+12  and then by F4, 
an1 ; a
n+2
2
 f  an 11 ; an+12 . Thus we have constructed a discrete set of points on another
indi¤erence curve from the initial two curves. Repeating this procedure we can ll R2+ with
countable sets of points on countably many indi¤erence curves.
Now consider a particular indi¤erence curve that lies between two members of this
set, as illustrated in Figure 4: Dene

a
1
2
1 ; a
1
2
2

implicitly by

a
1
2
1 ; a
1
2

f

a01; a
1
2
2

and
a
1
2
1 ; a
1
2
2

f (a01; a02). Construct a ight of stairs between the indi¤erence curves through
a01; a
1
2
2

and through (a01; a
0
2) as described above. Then we have in direction of decreasing
36Their theorem is stated in section 5.1 of the text.
37See Keeney and Rai¤a (1976).
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Figure 3: Lock-Step Procedure, Constructing a ight of stairs.
a2:

a
n+1
2
1 ; a
n+1
2
2

f

a
n
2
1 ; a
n
2
2

and

a
n 1
2
1 ; a
n
2
2

f

a
n+1
2
1 ; a
n+2
2
2

: Therefore, by construction
a
n
2
1 ; a
n+1
2
2

f

a
n+1
2
1 ; a
n+2
2
2

and then by F4,

a
n 1
2
1 ; a
n+1
2
2

f

a
n
2
1 ; a
n+2
2
2

.
Proceed analogously in the direction of increasing a2.
This demonstrates that if the vertical distance, measured in second components units,
between the indi¤erence curves through (a01; a
0
2) and (a
0
1; a
1
2) in a
n
1 is the same as between those
through (a01; a
1
2) and (a
0
1; a
2
2) in a
n 1
1 , then it is also the same between those through (a
0
1; a
0
2)
and

a01; a
1
2
2

in a
n
2
1 and between those through

a01; a
1
2
2

and (a01; a
1
2) in a
n 1
2
1 . Repeating this
procedure we can generate a dense set of points on indi¤erence curves that are dense in R2+.
Then continuity of f allows us to complete the entire map. Hence, if (a1; a2) f (a01; a02)
and (a1;ea2) f (a01;ea02), then (ea1; a2) f (ea01; a02), (ea1;ea2) f (ea01;ea02).
As a result, we can create a mapping a2 !  (a2) that transforms the original indi¤erence
map to be quasi-linear (vertically parallel indi¤erence curves). The algorithm, which is
formally described below, involves proceeding in innitesimal steps and equalizing the step
heights .
Set  (1) := 0. To determine  (a2) for a2 > 1, pick an arbitrary a1 and let a01 solve
(a1; a2) f (a01; 1 + ), where  will be innitesimal for the integration.38 This solution
exists by F3. Then for every a2 2 (1; a2]:39
Let a1 solve (a

1; a

2) f (a01; 1 + ).
38As established above, the result of this mapping will be independent of the choice of a1.
39The existence of solutions in the two cases below is guaranteed by the same reasoning as in the above
discussion.
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Figure 4: Lock-Step Procedure, Completing the indi¤erence map.
Let a1 solve (a

1 ; a

2 +) f (a01; 1 + ).
Let a02 solve (a

1; a
0
2) f (a01; 1).
Let da02 solve (a

1 ; a
0
2 + da
0
2) f (a01; 1).
Note that by F2, a02 < a

2 and a
0
2 + da
0
2 < a

2 +.
Dene implicitly d (a2) := e (a02 + da02)   (a02), where
e (a) :=   (a) for a  a2
 (a2) + a  a2 for a > a2
and then
 (a2) :=  (1) +
a2Z
1
d (a2) =
a2Z
1
d (a2) :
Analogously determine  (a2) for a2 < 1: Pick an arbitrary a01 and let a1 solve (a1; a2) f
(a01; 1). Then for every a

2 2 [a2; 1):
Let a1 solve (a

1; a

2) f (a01; 1).
Let a1 solve (a

1 ; a

2  ) f (a01; 1).
Let a02 solve (a

1; a
0
2) f (a01; 1 + ).
Let da02 solve (a

1 ; a
0
2   da02) f (a01; 1 + ).
Note that a02 < a

2 and a
0
2 + da
0
2 < a

2 + by F2.
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Dene implicitly d (a2) :=  (a
0
2)  e (a02   da02), where
e (a) :=   (a) for a  a2
 (a2)  a+ a2 for a < a2
and
 (a2) :=  (1) +
a2Z
1
d (a2) =  
1Z
a2
d (a2) < 0:
Then  : R+ ! R, is a continuous and increasing function. The f indi¤erence curves are
quasi-linear with respect to  (a2), so there is an increasing continuous function  : R+ ! R,
such that  (a1) +  (a2) generates the same indi¤erence map. Hence re-dening
' (a) :=  (a1) +  (a2)
represents f . Dene
v1 (a1) := exp ( (a1)) and v2 (a2) := exp ( (a2)) :
Then v1; v2 : R+ ! R++ are increasing and continuous and if we re-dene, yet again,
' (a) := v1 (a1) v2 (a2), it represents f . By F3, the functions v1; v2 must be unbounded.
That the representation satises the axioms is easy to verify.
8.4. Proof of Theorem 4
(i) The analogue of Theorem 1 can be established by substituting a 1 for a2 in the theorem
and in the proof, where now ' : RN+ ! R.
Let ' be a representation of f . Let ' := sup
a2RN+
' (a) and ' := inf
a2RN+
' (a), if they are well
dened. Otherwise, take ' =1 and ' =  1.
As before, let S := f(a0; '0) : Y (a0; '0) 6= ;g. By FN3 and the representation analogous to
Theorem 1, u (a1)  u (0) > g (a; ') for (a; ') 2 S.
Let S be a binary relation on S dened by (a; ') S (ea; e') , fa;bg  nea; ebo 8b 2
Y (a; ') and 8eb 2 Y a; eb.
Dene US : RN+ 
 
'; '
! R such that US (a; ') := U (a;b) for some b 2 Y (a; '). By
Theorem 1, S is a weak order that can be represented by US. Note that the Consistency
axiom (P5) is relevant precisely on this domain. For (a; ') =2 S dene
US (a; ') :=

0 for ' (a) < '
u (a1) for ' (a)  ' .
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Claim 4.1: US is continuous in all arguments.
Proof: Since the utility function is continuous on S, and because outside of S the function
was chosen to be either a constant (hence continuous) or a continuous function, the only
candidates for discontinuity are points on the boundary of S. There are two cases:
Case 1) ' (a) > ': Take (a; ') 2 bdr (S). Since (a; ') is a boundary point, it must be that
' (a) = '. Now let fan; 'ng be a sequence in S which converges to (a; '). By the denition
of S, Us
  
an1 ; a
n
 1

; 'n

= u (an1 ) g
  
an1 ; a
n
 1

; 'n

. Because preferences are continuous and
using the properties of g from Theorem 1, we have lim
n!1
u (an1 )  g
  
an1 ; a
n
 1

; 'n

= u (a1) as
required.
Case 2) ' (a) < ': Take (a; ') 2 bdr (S). Again, let fan; 'ng be an arbitrary sequence
in S which converges to (a; '). By the denition of S,
Us
  
an1 ; a
n
 1

; 'n

= u (an1 )  g
  
an1 ; a
n
 1

; 'n

> inf
b
fu (b1) : ' (b) = 'n and b1 < an1g .
Since  is continuous, we have
lim
n!1
u (an1 )  g
  
an1 ; a
n
 1

; 'n

= u (a1)  g ((a1; a 1) ; ') 
inf
b
fu (b1) : ' (b) = ' and b1 < a1g = u (0) .
where the last equality is implied by FN3 . As (a; ') =2 S, we claim that
u (a1)   g ((a1; a 1) ; ')  inf
b
fu (b1) : ' (b) = ' and fbg  fa;bgg = u (0). If not, then
u (a1)  g ((a1; a 1) ; ') = u (c1) > u (0). But for any c with c1 > 0, using FN3 , we could nd
c0 with c01 < c1 and ' (c
0) = ' (c). Using Theorem 1, this would imply that (a; ') 2 S, which
is a contradiction. Combining we have lim
n!1
u (an1 )  g
  
an1 ; a
n
 1

; 'n

= u (0), as required.k
Denition: For (a; ') 2 S, dene IS (a; ') := f(a0; '0) : (a0; '0) S (a; ')g  S. That
is, IS (a; ') is the S equivalence class of (a;').
Let a1 : R2+ 
 
'; '
! R+ be the solution to
u (a1 (a; ')) = u (a1)  g (a; ') = US (a; ') .
a1 is the "rst component equivalent" functional on S.
40 Since u (a1) > u (a1)   g (a; ') >
40Formally, 8x 2 RN 1+ , f(a1 (a; ') ;x)g  fa;bg ;8b 2 Y (a; ')
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u (0) and S is continuous, a1 is well dened and we have (a; ') S (ea; e') , a1 (a; ') >
a1 (ea; e').
Claim 4.2: The shame g (a; ') is strictly increasing in '.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that there is '0 > ' and (a; '0) S (a; ') for some a.
Then for '0 > '00 > '000 > ' we must have (a; '00) S (a; '000) as shame is weakly in-
creasing in '. Now pick a0 such that (a0; ') S (a0; '0) and (a0; ') ; (a0; '0) 2 S. This is
possible by continuity of US, since for a00 such that ' (a00) = ' the denition of US yields
US (a
00; ') > US (a00; '0). Then by P5, (a0; '000) S (a0; '00), a contradiction to shame being
weakly increasing in '.k
Claim 4.3: For all (a; ') and e' 2 (' (a1;0) ; ') there exists ea such that (ea; e') 2 IS (a; ').
Proof: Dene ' implicitly by Us ((a1;0) ; ') = Us (a; '). This is possible by the In-
termediate Value Theorem, as Us ((a1;0) ; ' (a1;0)) = u (a1) > Us (a; ') > Us ((a1; 0) ; '),
where the last inequality is due to P4 and Claim 4.2. There are two cases to consider:
Case 1) e'  ': Then Us ((a1;0) ; e')  Us (a; ') according to the monotonicity of
shame. By FN3 there is a2 (e') that solves ' (a1; a2 (e') ;0) = e'. Then Us ((a1; a2 (e') ;0) ; e') 
Us (a; ') and by the Intermediate Value Theorem there is ea2 (e') 2 [0; a2 (e')) such that
Us ((a1;ea2 (e') ;0) ; e') = Us (a; ') :
Case 2) e' < ': Then
Us ((a

1 (a; ') ;0) ; e')  Us (a; ')  Us ((a1;0) ; e') .
By the Intermediate Value Theorem there is ea1 (e') 2 [a1 (a; ') ; a1] such that
Us ((ea1 (e') ;0) ; e') = Us (a; ') :k
Combining the two cases we see that e' parametrizes a path
ea(a;') (e') :=  (ea1 (e') ;0) for e' < '
(a1;ea2 (e') ;0) for e'  '
of allocations. According to Claim 4.2 ' (a) must be strictly increasing along this path. This
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implies ea(a;') (e') is strictly increasing in its rst component for e' < ' and in its second
component for e'  '.
Now we construct a S indi¤erence class close to the original one:
Claim 4.4: For ea(a;') (e') as dened above, '^+ d'(a;') (e') that solvesea(a;') (e') ; '^+ d'(a;') (e') 2 IS (a; '+ d')
is increasing in e'.
Proof: Assume e'0 > e'. There are two cases to consider:
Case 1) e'0 > ': Then ea1(a;')  e'0 = a1, ea1(a;') (e')  a1 and ea2(a;')  e'0 > ea2(a;') (e').
P4 implies ea(a;') (e') ; '^+ d'(a;') (e') S ea(a;')  e'0 ; '^+ d'(a;') (e') :
Case 2) e'0  ': Then ea2(a;')  e'0 = ea2(a;') (e') = 0 and ea1(a;')  e'0 > ea1(a;') (e').
As S is increasing in a1,ea(a;') (e') ; '^+ d'(a;') (e') S ea(a;')  e'0 ; '^+ d'(a;') (e') .
As shame increases in ', we must have '^+ d'(a;')
 e'0 > '^+ d'(a;') (e') in both cases.k
Now we dene a re-scaling ' 7!  (') in order to transform the original indi¤erence map
of US (a; ') to be quasi-linear. We proceed similarly to the proof of Theorem 3. Choose '0 2 
'; '

and dene  ('0) := 1. Further set  ('0 + d') := 1 + d, where d' is innitesimal.
To dene  (') for ' 6= '0, pick a such that '(a;') < '0. As '(a;') < ', this implies
'(a;') < min ['; '
0]. Choose a0 such that (a0; '0) 2 IS (a; '). We will look at the increasing
graphs e' and '^+ d'(a;') (e') as dened above. Consider two cases for applying the Lock-Step
Procedure:
Case 1) ' > '0: Dene a climbing ight of stairs between the graphs e' and e'+de'(a;') (e')
recursively: Let 'n+1 solve
 ea(a;') ('n) ; 'n+1 S (a0; '0 + d'). The solution exists by the
construction of ea(a;') ('n).
Case 2) ' < '0: Dene a descending ight of stairs between the graphs e' and e' +
de'(a;') (e') recursively: Let ' n 1 solve  ea(a;') (' n 1) ; ' n S (a0; '0 + d').
Then  (e') can be determined analogously to the proof of Theorem 2 by equalizing all
step-heights to d' and integrating. Due to P5 this denition is independent of the choice of
a0.
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Now the indi¤erence map of US (a; ') is quasi linear in  ('), where  : R++ ! R is
strictly increasing and continuous. Further remember that US (a; ') is strictly decreasing in
'. Therefore, there exists H : RN+ ! R, such that H (a)   (') represents S on S.
Dene uS (a1) := H (a)  lim
'!'(a)
 ('). Because of P1,
U (fa;bg) :=
8><>:
uS (a1) if fag  fa;bg  fbg
H (a)   (' (b)) if fag  fa;bg  fbg
uS (b1) if fag  fa;bg  fbg
represents  conned to the collection of all two element sets. Therefore, H (a)  uS (a1) +
 (' (a)) must hold. Hence
U (A) = max
a2A
[us (a1) +  (' (a))] max
b2A
[ (' (b))]
represents  on K, where ' represents f , and us and  are strictly increasing. Since '
represents f , so does  ('). Hence, there is a representation ' of f , such that  is the
identity and
U (A) = max
a2A
[us (a1) + ' (a)] max
b2A
[' (b)]
represents  on K.
(ii) To establish the analogue of Theorem 3, namely that there are N increasing un-
bounded functions v1; ::; vN , such that the fairness ranking f can be represented by ' (a) =
v1 (a1)  :::  vN (an), if and only if it satises F1; F2; FN3 and FN4 we apply the Theorem
of Luce and Tukey, just as in the proof of Theorem 3. It establishes the existence of an
additive representation 1 (a1) + ::: + N (aN) of f . Dene vn (an) := exp (n (an)) for all
n 2 f1; ::; Ng. Then v1; ::; vN : R+ ! R++ are increasing and continuous and if we re-dene
' (a) := v1 (a1)  :::  vN (aN), it represents f . By FN3 , the functions v1; ::; vN must be
unbounded.
That the representations satisfy the axioms is easy to verify.
8.5. Proof of Proposition
Dene the random variable Xn := n   x1.
Claim 5.1: DMs utility is a decreasing function of jXnj
Proof: DM chooses a to maximize
40
u (d (a; x1)) + N

E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

  E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

.
Since  is a su¢ cient statistic for xN , we can write:
E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

= E

E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) j

jxn

.
This expression is single peaked as a function of a:
E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) j

= E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a  ; xi)) j0

=: f (a  ) ,
where f is symmetric and single peaked, with a peak in 0 and .41 Write xn () for the
density function corresponding to   N

n; 2n

. It is single peaked with peak in n. Thus,
E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

=
Z


f (a  )xn () d
is the convolution of two symmetric single peaked functions, with peak in 0 and n, re-
spectively. Then E

NQ
i=1
u (d (a; xi)) jxn

is single peaked with peak in a = n. This means
that fairness is maximized at a = n and, therefore, shame is increasing with
n   a. By
assumption, DMs selsh utility is decreasing with ja  x1j. Therefore, DM in e¤ect choosesn   a 2 [0; jXnj]. Fix Xn and denote by l (jXnj) DMs optimal choice of n   a and
V (l (jXnj) ; jXnj) the associated (total) utility. Then for jX 0nj < jXnj,
max f0; jX 0nj   l (jXnj)g  jXnj   l (jXnj)
and
min fjX 0nj ; l (jXnj)g  l (jXnj)
with at least one inequality strict. Therefore,
V (l (jXnj) ; jXnj) < V (min fjX 0nj ; l (jXnj)g ; jX 0nj)
and by denition
V (min fjX 0nj ; l (jXnj)g ; jX 0nj)  V (l (jX 0nj) ; jX 0nj) .
41The rst equality is justied, since only the distance, which is symmetric, enters the utility functions.
41
Combining the two inequalities establishes the result.k
For given , note that
Xn j  N

  
2 + n2
;
2 (2 (n  1) (2v2 + n2) + v4)
(n2 + 2)2

.
Dene Hn () :=   22+n2 , so Hn ()  N

0; 
6
(2+n2)2

. Then
[Xn  Hn ()] jHn ()  N

0;
2 (2 (n  1) (2v2 + n2) + v4)
(n2 + 2)2

.
Let hn (Hn ()) and gn (Xn  Hn ()) denote the associated density functions. The convolu-
tion R
hn (Hn ()) gn (Xn  Hn ()) dHn ()
yields
Xn  N

0;
2 (2 (m  1) (2v2 + n2) + v4) + v6
(n2 + 2)2

.
Hence for every n, 42
p (jXnj = z) _ exp
"
 z
2
2
(2 + n2)
2
(2 (2 (n  1) (2v2 + n2) + v4) + v6)
#
.
Consequently
p (jXnj = z)
p (jXmj = z)
_ exp
24 z2
2
0@ (2+n2)2(2(2(n 1)(2v2+n2)+v4)+v6)
  (
2+m2)
2
(2(2(m 1)(2v2+m2)+v4)+v6)
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= : exp

 z
2
2
c; (m;n)

:
Thus, the ratio p(jXnj=z)
p(jXmj=z) satises the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP): If
c; (m;n) < (>) 0, then
p(jXnj=z)
p(jXmj=z) increases (decreases) with z. Since DMs utility is de-
creasing in z, she will strictly prefer m over n (n over m) if and only if c; (m;n) < (>) 0.
In the text we dene the ratio of the standard deviations  and  as s := 

. s is a su¢ -
42We use the fact that for a Normal distribution with mean 0, p (Xn = z) = p (Xn =  z). With _ we
denote "proportional to".
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cient statistic for (; ). Assuming n > m, we nd, with some straightforward algebra, that
cs (m;n) < (>) 0, if and only if 2 + (m+ n) s2   3s4   2 (m+ n) s6  mns8 < (>) 0.
Claim 5.2: For n > m, cs (m;m+ 1) < 0 implies cs (n; n+ 1) < 0.
Proof:
2 + (m+ (m+ 1)) s2   3s4   2 (m+ (m+ 1)) s6  m (m+ 1) s8 < 0
is equivalent to
2  3s4
2m+ 1
< 2s6 +
m2 +m
2m+ 1
s8   s2:
Let lhs := 2 3s
4
2m+1
and rhs := 2s6 + m
2+m
2m+1
s8   s2. Consider two cases:
i) 2  3s4 > 0: @
@m
(lhs) < 0 and @
@m
(rhs) > 0 implies cs (n; n+ 1) < 0 for n > m.
ii) 2  3s4  0: Then for all m, lhs  0 and rhs > 0, which implies cs (n; n+ 1) < 0 for
n > m.k
s as dened in the text solves cs (1; 2) = 0.
Claim 5.3: For s  s, cs (m;m+ 1) = 0 has a unique solution n (s) 2 R+. For s > s, no
positive solution exists.
Proof: Assume rst s  s: To show existence, note that due to the quadratic term in
m, m!1 implies cs (m;m+ 1)!  1 for all s. Since cs (m;m+ 1) is continuous in m, it
is su¢ cient to show that cs (1; 2) > 0 for all s  s. cs (1; 2) > 0 is equivalent to
2 + 3s2   3s4   6s6   2s8 > 0
or
2=s2 + 3 > 3s2 + 6s4 + 2s6 8s  s.
For this last inequality @
@s
(lhs) < 0 and @
@s
(rhs) > 0. Since 2=s2+3s = 3s2+6s4+2s6,
cs (1; 2) > 0 must hold for all s  s. Hence a solution m = n (s) exists. Its uniqueness
follows directly from claim 5.1.
Consider now the case s > s: In that case cs (1; 2) < 0. Claim 1 implies that no solution
exists to the equation cs (m;m+ 1) = 0 for any m 2 R+.k
Claim 5.4: n (s) is decreasing in s.
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Proof:
2 + (n + (n + 1)) s2   3s4   2 (n + (n + 1)) s6   n (n + 1) s8 = 0
is equivalent to
2=s2   3s2
2n + 1
= 2s4 +
n2 + n
2n + 1
s6   1:
For this equality @
@n (lhs) < 0 and
@
@n (rhs) > 0 for all s, while
@
@s
(lhs) < 0 and @
@s
(rhs) > 0
for all n.k
Thus, if DM prefers n = 1 to n = 2, then n (s) = 1 is her globally preferred value. If she
prefersm to bothm 1 andm+1, then n (s) = m is her globally preferred value. Neglecting
the integer constraint, m = n (s) is the unique positive solution to 2 + (m+ (m+ 1)) s2  
3s4   2 (m+ (m+ 1)) s6   m (m+ 1) s8 = 0, if a solution exists. Furthermore, n (s) is a
decreasing function.
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